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THE FRAMEWORK
Learner models are important within computer-based systems intended to promote learning because they provide the means to support intelligent individually-adapted instruction. The task of 'learner modelling' or 'cognitive diagnosis' (that is, the task of building a learner model) is defined later, but, in short, it is the process of inferring the learner's knowledge by analysing his or her behaviour.
Although a number of learner modelling techniques have been developed, learner modelling remains a serious problem for the implementation of computer-based educational systems. Simply enumerating these techniques does not really help us: we need a framework describing precisely the role of these techniques in order to discuss their adequacy. As we will see, it turns out that many of the techniques are not alternatives but address different aspects of the learner modelling problem.
The aim of this report is to provide a comprehensive conceptual framework for learner modelling. The framework we propose includes a formalism, a terminology and a graphical representation of the learner modelling process.
The purposes of this framework are :
1. to define a consistent terminology for use in research on learner modelling, 2. to describe several approaches to learner modelling and to make precise their particular focus, 3. to describe especially the contributions of machine learning techniques, 4. to emphasize the importance of conceptual aspects in learner modelling, 5. to identify (implicit) underlying assumptions.
The vertical dimension
Vertically (see Figure 1 ), the framework discriminates three related entities. The relationship between these entities is that they all concern the same problem domain . If we adapt the definition proposed by Van de Velde (1988) , a problem domain is a triple Ω = (P,B,Solution) where:
P is the set of problems in Ω B is the set of possible behaviours in Ω Solution is a relation between P and B, i.e. Solution is a subset of P X B.
A behaviour (b) is defined as a sequence of actions performed by an agent (a) as a potential solution for some problem (p) belonging to P. A behaviour will be described by the following syntax: behaviour(agent,problem) = b a p. The agent may be the learner or the computer system. B, the set of possible behaviours, is generally very large, since it includes any correct, incorrect, or even inconsistent behaviour.
The behavioural knowledge (bk) of the domain corresponds to Van de Velde's concept of problem solver. A problem solver contains an inference structure and a logical theory. The inference structure is a set of inferential primitives and inference relations to be used to infer some behaviour b (from B) for a given problem p (from P).
The conceptual knowledge (ck) contains the definition of the concepts underlying the behavioural knowledge. The discrimination between the behavioural and conceptual knowledge corresponds to the "shallow" vs "deep" knowledge issue raised in expert system design (as will be discussed below). The deep knowledge consists of domain theories and problem solving knowledge; the shallow knowledge is a procedural description of the problem solutions.
As shown in Figure 1 , the conceptual knowledge may exceed the problem domain Ω,
i.e. it may enclose concepts which are usable for problems not present in P. In the following example, ck's concepts such as "disease" or "symptoms" are not restricted to the bk's context of heart disease diagnosis. For example :
Ω the problem of heart disease diagnosis
the diagnosis produced by a doctor for a particular patient bk set of Mycin-like rules for diagnosis and the inference engine ck representation of the heart, concepts for diseases, diagnostic strategy, etc.
Conceptual Knowledge
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Behaviour Ω Figure 1 . The vertical dimension of the framework Globally, the vertical relation is one of consistency. The relation between the behavioural knowledge and the behaviour has a level of consistency dependent on the logical theory inscribed in the behavioural knowledge. This relationship may be viewed top-down as a "running " process: the behaviour is the result of running the behavioural knowledge on a particular problem of P. The relationship between the conceptual and behavioural knowledge may be viewed top-down as some knowledge compilation process.
The consistency between two entities will be denoted in our framework formalism by the symbol ¢ (0<¢<1), where ¢=1 denotes complete consistency:
¢(bk,b a p) indicates the consistency between the behavioural knowledge and a's behaviour for problem p.
¢ (ck,bk) indicates the consistency between the conceptual and behavioural knowledge sets.
¢(b a p,ck)
indicates the consistency between a's behaviour for problem p and his conceptual knowledge.
As we will see, most work on learner modelling postulates high values for the various ¢. In general, the quality of the diagnosis built will be a function of the values of the ¢. By definition, a behaviour results directly from bk and indirectly from ck, and hence we can state that normally ¢(ck,b a p) < ¢(bk,b a p).
When we want to refer indifferently to bk or ck, we will use *k.
The horizontal dimension
By contrast to the vertical dimension, the horizontal one (see Figure 2 ) emphasizes discrepancies between the same entities possessed by different agents. The learner modelling context involves two agents, namely the learner and the system. The object of learner modelling is to build the best representation of the learner (we will indicate below what might be meant by 'best' in this context). Our model emphasizes the fact that this is only a computerised representation of the learner's knowledge, an approximation, and that the system has no direct access to his/her knowledge.
This horizontal dimension clearly indicates that our framework adopts a differential perspective. The term "differential modelling" is often used when the learner's behaviour and knowledge is represented with respect to the system's behaviour and knowledge. In the formalism used in this framework, we use the expression R a x to denote the representation that an agent a has of some object x.
So the model horizontally discriminates three entities : There is a clear difference between 'discrepancies' and 'consistencies': discrepancies indicate differences between two similar entities (e.g. two behaviours), while consistencies emphasize the logical link between very different things (e.g. an agent's knowledge and his behaviour).
The model
The two described dimensions are crossed for forming the model : each entity of the vertical dimension exists for each entity of the horizontal dimension (see Figure 3) . The model contains the following components: R s ck the system's (representation of) conceptual knowledge. ...
Voluntarily we used the term "system" which is quite vague. The word "system" might be replaced by "ITS", or more precisely by one of the ITS components. The standard ITS components are the expert (or domain model), the tutor (or pedagogical model), the diagnoser + learner model and the interface. When we are speaking about the knowledge required for solving a class of problems (i.e. R s bk) or about the system's behaviour (i.e. b s p), the "s" indeed refers to the expert component. Similarly, the "s" in R s R l bk is indeed the diagnoser component. Such a discrimination among the system's components is however not pertinent in our formalisms because the diagnostic component highly depends on the expert knowledge for building the diagnosis. Moreover, this structure of ITS is currently much criticised (Self, 1988; Elsom-Cook, 1990; Winkels, 1990 To indicate that the representations of learner knowledge are diagnoses built from some behaviour, we write
where ƒ d is some diagnostic function.
The so-called learner model is, according to the designer approach, R s R l bk and/or R s R l ck, i.e. the output described above. The word "model" may have various significations, from a simple enumeration of characteristics or numeric parameters (as in traditional CAI) to an integrated set of knowledge, close to the idea of mental model proposed by cognitive scientists.
The learner modelling process (or diagnosis process) is the process of inferring a learner model (or diagnosis) from a learner's behaviour. A possible goal of the learner modelling process is to obtain the best image of R l ck and R l bk, i.e. to minimize respectively ∆(R l ck,R s R l ck) and ∆(R l bk,R s R l bk).
The system needs to be informed about the quality of its output, i.e. to receive some appraisal of the value of ∆(R l *k,R s R l *k). We call this information diagnosis feedback.
It is clearly different from the didactic feedback used in tutorial interactions: diagnosis feedback confirms to the system that its representation of the learner fits with the learner's representation, while didactic feedback, on the other hand, tells the learner how his representation fits with the system's representation. We will later on describe several ways for obtaining this feedback :
-behavioural prediction : the learner's behaviours are used to confirm the diagnosis or to choose among current hypotheses, -explicit interaction : the learner is asked to confirm the expert system's diagnosis, -behavioural simulation : R s R l bk is run to produce a predicted b l p' which is compared to b l p -if they match the diagnosis is confirmed (under the postulate that the running process is isomorphic to human reasoning).
-didactic prediction : if the learner model is valid, it can be used to select a didactic action, i.e. to predict the efficiency of this action or to anticipate the learner's knowledge after the action. If the predicted changes happen, the diagnosis is confirmed (this raises two problems which are described in section 4.4.2).
-human validation : expert teachers propose a diagnosis to compare with the system's diagnosis -this is generally done off-line, with written protocols, only during the system design stage.
At this stage, we are of course glossing over a great many details and subtleties -if we bear with it, most of these issues will, we hope, be addressed.
The model's context
Here we list some implicit assumptions which are generally present in learner modelling work :
Assumption 1 : Learner modelling is related to some idea of what tutoring is: ITSs need diagnostics for taking decisions, which means that it is the system which takes the didactic decisions, and not the learner. (A possible alternative justification for learner modelling is that it enables the ITS to show the learner his own knowledge, misconceptions, etc.)
Assumption 2 : The learner model is seldom exhaustively described (which is theoretically impossible given the infinite amount of common sense knowledge involved).
More often, it is by default assumed to be closely related to the system's (conceptual or behavioural) model. This means that only the discrepancies between these two set of knowledge need to be represented (hence the "diagnosis" term, defined in section 2.2.2). This is the basic assumption of any differential approach, but it is also a major point of criticism of work in learner modelling.
Assumption 3 : Another assumption is that learners are viewed as correctly applying an incorrect algorithm (i.e. in our formalism, R l bk is wrong but ¢(b l p,R l bk) is high), while instead most work in education considers the learners as incorrectly applying a correct algorithm.
Our model integrates Wenger's (1987) discrimination between 'behavioural diagnosis' (similar to R s R l bk in our model) and 'epistemic diagnosis' (R s R l ck in our model). However, the framework does not address what Wenger calls 'individual diagnosis'. The emphasis is on the dynamic modelling of learner knowledge states, not on modelling longer-term, knowledge-independent, individual attributes. The justification for this is not that such attributes are necessarily unimportant (although the designers of ITSs
have not yet found great need for them) but that ITS research has yet to consider them in any detail. In particular, there are no significant techniques for inferring such attributes from learner's behaviour. If such attributes were to be added to the framework then they would not be expressed in a differential fashion but as an extra dimension to the learner column.
Our model has to be simpler than the reality, as manifested in existing ITSs, since these are rather undisciplined agglomerations of miscellaneous techniques. Our model is only useful if it erases non-pertinent details in order to give a clear view of the modelled process. This means we will have to abandon irrelevant details or to "cut the corners" in our descriptions of some systems in order to integrate them neatly within the framework.
Nonetheless, we feel that the framework captures the essential distinguishing features of the various techniques (as described in sections 3 and 4).
TERMINOLOGY
The terminology we outlined in the previous section has now to be elaborated. Much of the terminology of learner modelling has been introduced for a specific application or approach. This specificity reduces the ability to generalize across approach descriptors : if one approach X is described by characteristics A and B, it does not mean that A and B are dependent on each other, or specific to X, but that X results from a combination of A and B. We believe our discipline will progress if some general descriptors are available.
Obviously, since these generalised descriptors lose the specificity that their authors introduced, there is a risk in proposing less specific descriptions. This will be corrected later, where approaches and systems are described individually. In the mean time, this common terminology will favour comparisons between approaches and ease the identification of the focus of various approaches. We aim for instance to show that some approaches are not incompatible but complementary, because the points on which they differ constitute different parts of the diagnosis process.
The meanings of "behaviour" and "solution"
Until now, we have used "behaviour" to describe the solution proposed to a problem p by the learner or by the system. For an equation 3x+5=20, the solution is x=5 ; for a medical diagnosis problem, the solution is the diagnosed disease, etc. The main characteristic of the learner's behaviour is that it is observable by the system : if the learner's behaviour b l p is defined as a sequence of actions the learner performs on the system interface then
This definition is less clear when we consider the "product versus process" issue.
Some ambiguity arises because some intermediate steps of the inference process also produce behaviour : for instance, the sequence of transformations written when solving an equation or the sequence of questions asked by the doctor. In AI literature, the word 'solution' is used for describing not only the final solution but also the solution process.
Hence we prefer to call the sequence of actions which relate p to b (or in other words, some trace of the inference process) the solution path. The solution is usually the last step of the solution path. This definition does not eliminate the ambiguity completely, for instance in theorem proving, where the solution process (the sequence of logical transformations) is indeed the expected solution.
When some steps of the solution path are made observable to the system, they will be considered to be a part of the behaviour. Hence, the learner's behaviour may be defined as the observable subset of the solution path, generally including the last step.
Our definition of a learner's behaviour emphasizes the mental/observable characteristics of inference steps. This distinction does not hold for systems since all of the system's inference steps from p to b may be hidden or made observable by the designer.
Subsequently, we will focus on the subset of the system's behaviour b s p which corresponds (in some sense to be discussed) to the learner's behaviour.
We will also see that, in many cases, learner modelling will not be performed from a single behaviour but from a set of behaviours B a P produced for a set of problems P. We will see later on the rationale for enlarging the behaviour to a larger subset of the inference process or to several behaviours.
Classes of discrepancies
The ITS literature has given different names to the various ∆ relationships (discrepancies between the models' columns):
System -(represented) learner discrepancies
The first kinds of discrepancy are between the system's knowledge and the (represented) learner knowledge. These discrepancies have been (inconsistently) called misconceptions, bugs, mal-rules, etc. We try here to propose some stricter definitions.
These discrepancies are the key objects in the learner modelling process which has mainly been approached in a differential way, i.e. by characterizing the learner's knowledge by its differences with respect to the system's knowledge. A misconception refers to a discrepancy at the conceptual level. The real misconception is the discrepancy between the system's and the learner's representation of ck. Since the system has no direct access to the learner's representation of ck, misconceptions are approximated by the discrepancy between the system's ck and the system's representation of the learner's ck :
A bug refers to a discrepancy at the behavioural level. By contrast to the psychological connotation of the word "misconception", the term "bug" comes from the language of computing: in the early work of Brown and Burton (1978) , discrepancies were represented by buggy procedures. Since the system has no direct access to the learner's representation of bk, bugs approximate the relation between the learner's and the system's representations of bk:
Since the behavioural model has generally been represented as a production system, bugs have also been called mal-rules. The terms "bug catalogue " or "bug library" simply refer to a set of bugs, generally predefined by the system designers.
An error refers to a discrepancy between the learner's behaviour and the system's behaviour. Here, most systems are based on the postulate that the system has a perfect representation of the learner's behaviour. This postulate holds if, as above, we define the learner's behaviour as the set of actions he or she performs on the system's interface (and exclude any mental or off-system activity). In this case:
This definition assumes that there is only a single system's behaviour which is deemed to be correct. In general, this is not the case. The R s bk may not be fully deterministic; for example, it may represent a procedure for manipulating algebraic equations in which transformations may be carried out in different orders and yet eventually lead to an acceptable solution. In this case, we might define a learner to be in error if R s b l p differs from all such b s ps, and the error to refer to the discrepancy between the learner's behaviour and the 'best matching' system's behaviour (although this clearly gives rise to difficult diagnostic problems).
The term diagnosis (sometimes "cognitive diagnosis") refers to the interpretation of an error, as performed by the system. According to the designer's focus on the conceptual or behavioural level, the outcome of a diagnosis should be the identification of one or more bugs or misconceptions. The slightly different nuances associated with the terms "diagnosis" and "learner model" might derive from the fact that the latter implies that one aims to represent the learner's mental model while the former would represent a more narrow and faulty piece of knowledge. We do not retain these nuances and use the term "(cognitive) diagnosis process" synonymously with "learner modelling process".
An "overlay model" is one in which the only possible diagnosed discrepancies are missing pieces of knowledge: R s *k ⊃ R s R l *k. The use of the term "overlay" is not ideal because of its ambiguity: "partial model" would definitely be better, but "overlay" has already a long history in ITS.
The term "perturbation model" specifies that R s R l bk may include elements which are not part of R s bk and hence 'perturb' its functioning.This term emphasizes the atomicity of these discrepancies. This atomicity presents computational advantages (it eases the search problem, discussed later) but appears to be poorly plausible at the psychological level as soon as one leaves highly-constrained domains.
We do not like the negative connotations of terms such as bugs or mal-rules. Rather than speak about "buggy" learners, we prefer to search for a rational account of why learners develop cognitive processes which are ill-adapted to Ω. In many cases, the "buggy" process may be the result of an intelligent adaptation to previous situations, successful when acquired but now inadequate in Ω. Repair theory (see section 3.2.2) opens the way in this direction. However, we will continue to use the term "bug" because it is now standard in the ITS community.
The same nuance applies with conceptual discrepancies: the term "misconception" is negatively connotated. In particular, it neglects the fact that a learner may adopt a viewpoint which, although different to that of the system, is still reasonable. The difference between a misconception and a viewpoint is double. Firstly, a viewpoint emphasizes the fact that various approaches to the same domain may be pertinent, and that there is not necessarily one approach which is more valid than the others. Secondly, the term "viewpoint" indicates some conceptualisation of Ω which is larger than a misconception and is, in some way, closer to the idea of mental model (see section 3.1.2).
Learner -represented learner discrepancies
∆(b l p,R s b l p) represents a source of noise at the input of the learner modelling process. As said in the previous section, this discrepancy is usually considered to be nonexistent. In general, this discrepancy denotes any misrepresentation of the learner's actual behaviour. ∆(R l *k,R s R l *k) represents the discrepancy at the output of the learner modelling process. We call it the diagnosis error. The diagnosis error indicates how precisely the represented knowledge approximates the actual knowledge possessed by the learner. Since the 'sum' of the discrepancies around the R l *k,R s R l *k,R s *k triangle must be zero:
A misdiagnosis is defined to be a diagnosis error which is considered to be significative or important (as discussed in section 2.5.1).
Classes of consistencies
Several kinds of consistency relationship may be located in the model : ¢(R s bk,b s p) expresses the consistency between the system's behavioural model and its behaviour. It is determined by the logical theory included in the behavioural model.
If R s bk is a production system, ¢(R s bk,b s p) is determined by the logic of the associated inference engine. The same comment is valid for the consistency of the eventual direct relationship between the conceptual knowledge and the behaviour: ¢(R s ck,b s p). ¢(R s ck,R s bk) expresses the consistency between the system's conceptual and behavioural models of the same domain. When these both exist (which is seldom), these models are usually implemented separately. This means that this kind of consistency results from the competence of the knowledge engineer who performed the knowledge acquisition process.
¢(R l bk,b l p) is affected by the main source of noise in learner modelling: many behaviours may not be related to characteristics of the behavioural knowledge but to factors such as distraction, tiredness, and involuntary mistakes. These are called non-systematic mistakes or slips. (Slips are specific to human agents, not computer systems.) A slip is defined to be a piece of behaviour which does not correspond to the agent's intention. A slip, as opposed to a mistake, will generally be recognised as such if it is pointed out to the agent. Assuming that a slip occurs only intermittently, it may sometimes be detected by a difference between two behaviours produced by the same agent as a solution for the same problem. One generally does not ask a learner to solve the identical problem twice but instead to solve problems considered to be equivalent. Two problems p i and p j are considered to be equivalent (p i ≈ p j ) if their solutions require the activation of the same pieces of behavioural or conceptual knowledge:
This definition shows the complexity of identifying slips. Since p i is always slightly different from p j , the behavioural difference may be related to a very context-specific element instead of due to some slip. The fact that some errors may be related to only a very small subset of P is not a kind of noise, it is a characteristic of the learner knowledge.
Accepting that the learner's representation of the task includes some very task-specific elements is necessary if we want to describe the complexity of human behaviour with the seductive image of mental models. Moreover, p i and p j are presented at different times.
Hence, variations between the respective behaviours may be the result of real knowledge changes, e.g. the result of learning or forgetting.
is a crucial parameter of the quality of the diagnosis process. In general the logical theory used by R s bk is also used by R s R l bk since the latter is often viewed as a variation of the former. However, the postulate that the learner uses a reasoning process isomorphic to the system's logical theory is difficult to hold.
Isomorphic does not mean that the processes are themselves similar but that they produce similar effects. It is here that the issue of psychological validity takes its main importance.
The relations ¢(R l ck,R l bk) and ¢(R s R l ck,R s b l p) are still more complex. They refer to the process of knowledge compilation, discussed by Anderson (1983) . The relation between conceptual knowledge and behavioural knowledge is a matter of great controversy, particularly at the psychological level (i.e. concerning ¢(R l ck,R l bk)).
Strictly, the controversy concerns mainly the left most column of our framework, since in computational knowledge representations (the middle and right most columns) the distinction is more or less standard, although still of course a matter of debate. For the moment, the distinction is adopted as a heuristic device for analysing existing learner modelling techniques, without any strong philosophical commitment.
Diagnosis space
The learner modelling process may be viewed as a search process. The search space is the set of R s R l *k that the system is able to build. Usually R s R l *k is built by analysing R s *k and R s b l p. Since the relation between R s *k and R s R l *k is defined as a bug or misconception, the size of the search space may be defined by all the products of applying some combination of the bugs and misconceptions to the system's knowledge (which does not mean that this is the way this space is searched). We will call the search space the diagnosis space and denote it Ψ.
At the behavioural level, the diagnosis space will be defined as :
The meaning of the ** operator will be defined later when discriminating between several approaches. Similarly, for the diagnosis space at the conceptual level we define: Obviously, the search in the diagnosis space may be pruned by the fact that the system's representation of the learner should be consistent with the learner's behaviour.
Generally, a perfect consistency (¢(R s R l bk,R s b l p) = 1) may not be expected, as we have to take some noise into account. If we denote the noise by N, which varies between 0 and 1, we may write:
Ψ bk = { R s R l bk | R s R l bk = R s bk ** {bug 1 ... bug n }} and ¢(R s R l bk,R s b l p)>(1 -N) } As we will see, information about the learner's behaviour may be used in various ways (e.g. as an heuristic, as feedback).
Uses of cognitive diagnosis
A diagnosis process is a learning process, since it involves repeatedly proposing hypotheses and modifying them in the light of experience. A main source of background and heuristic knowledge in learning is the goal of learning, i.e. the usefulness of the acquired knowledge (as emphasised in work on explanation-based learning). Therefore it is important to consider the reasons why cognitive diagnosis is to be carried out. The goal of the diagnosis process is to provide information for choosing among didactic alternatives, with the underlying assumption that the didactic choices are best made by the system. This has two consequences:
Pragmatic approach
We have assumed that the goal of learner modelling is to minimise the difference between the learner's knowledge and its representation by the system : ∆(R l *k,R s R l *k).
One may -rightly -object that the goal of learner modelling is that it provide information to be used by the tutoring component and that fine perceptions of the learner's knowledge are not useful if they are not required to make a choice between didactic alternatives. In other words, a pragmatic approach may be expressed by the following rule: if the diagnosis error is smaller than the difference between two didactic choices leading to the same goal, then ignore the diagnosis error (since it cannot produce the 'wrong' choice), otherwise try to refine the diagnosis.
Or, more formally: define a didactic action DA by a triple (*k x ,DA,*k y ), where ∆(*k x ,*k y ) describes the expected knowledge changes associated with DA. This assumes a means-ends view of teaching where DAs are select according to the state-goal differences.
Assume that the system believes the learner to be in state X = R s R l *k. Then the pragmatic approach is:
But the obvious problem is that the value of ∆(R l *k,R s R l *k) (the diagnosis error) is not known by the system. Such a rule is therefore not a rule the system may apply but rather a rule for system design, given that the designer has some idea of the potential amplitude of diagnosis errors in his system.
Adaptive / evolutive discrimination
We can discriminate between two kinds of system on the basis of the time-scale over which the results of learner modelling are applied:
-adaptive systems : the diagnosis is only made for adapting the didactic choices to a particular learner, and it is abandoned for the next learner.
-evolutive systems : the diagnosis output (or some intermediate steps of the diagnosis process) are recorded and integrated within the system's knowledge in order to improve the diagnosis process for following learners.
This discrimination is pursued further in sections 3 and 4.
DIAGNOSIS APPROACHES
In this section we present a survey of the various approaches to learner modelling, expressed in terms of the framework presented above. We will illustrate the approaches by referring to ITSs described in the literature. We will not describe the systems completely but only their diagnosis processes and the things necessary to know to understand them.
The search space
The diagnosis space, as defined in section 2.4, is Ψ bk = { R s R l bk | R s R l bk = R s bk ** {bug 1 ... bug n }} and similarly for the conceptual level. It is thus composed by combining bugs and misconceptions with the system's representations of conceptual and behavioural knowledge. We now compare the various ways in which the diagnosis space is described and searched. Variations concerning the creation of the diagnosis space result from:
-The system's knowledge : the diagnosis space is created by variations of the system's knowledge R s *k. It is obviously domain dependent, which makes comparisons difficult.
However, we are interested in studying how the knowledge representation affects the definition of the search space.
-The bug and misconception catalogues : they define (some of) the variations of the system's knowledge . We are especially interested in studying how the bug catalogue {bug 1 ... bug n } is determined: is it predefined by the system's designer, is it acquired in some way through interaction with a learner or with an expert, or is it built dynamically by the system itself, or what?
-The generic operators define how R s *k and the bug and misconception catalogues interact with the system's knowledge to create Ψ. These operators are represented by ** and *** in our formalism.
This discrimination is not as clear as it (maybe) appears here. For instance, some systems do not generate the diagnosis space from the system's knowledge but directly from the learner behaviour. We will be more precise further on. If the diagnosis space is created from the system's knowledge then, since this "expert" model is domain dependent, we are not concerned with its content but rather with its structure and its knowledge representation scheme. More precisely, our interest concerns the relationship ƒ between the system's knowledge and the diagnosis space: Ψ = ƒ(R s *k).
Generic model
When the diagnosis space is created from variations of a single model R s *k -which is the most frequent case -we call the model a generic model. System models (behavioural or conceptual) gain generative power from their modularity. A set of relatively independent pieces of knowledge enables the generation of alternative sets by suppressing or substituting individual pieces. Modularity enables the system to access specific parts of knowledge, i.e. to build a finer diagnosis. This is at the same time an advantage and a disadvantage : quite often, the difference between the learner and the expert may not be restricted to a small piece of knowledge. This often leads to an over-syntactical view of human knowledge.
This modularity enables the calculation of the search space size (#(Ψ)) as a function of the number of pieces of knowledge in R s *k. In an overlay model for instance, the search space is the set of all models obtained by suppressing some number of pieces from R s *k :
The size of the diagnosis space is increased if external pieces of knowledge (bugs, misconceptions) may be combined with missing pieces. This size is then also function of the size of the bug or misconception catalogue (see section 3.2).
Three formalisms which have been used to give R s *k this modularity are production systems, procedural networks and declarative theories:
EXAMPLE : WUSOR (Carr and Goldstein, 1977) The 
Multiple models
Another approach is to put a set of models at the disposal of the system and to make the diagnosis space equal this set :
Obviously the size of the diagnosis space corresponds to the number of models: EXAMPLE : QUEST (Frederiksen and White, 1988) QUEST (Reiser, Anderson and Farrell, 1985) The R s bk of the LISP TUTOR is a production system modelling an 'ideal student' rather than an expert. This rule set is actually a subset of the complete production system available to the LISP TUTOR, tailored to suit the learner's level of knowledge -as the student progresses, so another rule set is switched in. The rule sets are specified in advance of the learner using the system. (Chan and Baskin, 1990) The 3.1.2.2 Unordered multiple models. In this case the system has at its disposal a set of models but there is no implied progression between the elements of the set. The elements provide alternative 'viewpoints' on the domain. The elements may be equally incorrect or equally correct.
EXAMPLE : INTEGRATION KID
Current research in cognitive psychology shows that individuals have distributed models, i.e. a collection of partial models (DiSessa,1986) , which are activated according to the context. These context-related partial models correspond to the concept of a viewpoint.
Their situatedness fits with the conception of expertise as the ability to adopt multiple viewpoints on the same class of problems (again, according to the context). The need for integrating multiple viewpoints within ITSs has recently received increasing support from the ITS research community. (Baker, 1990) 
EXAMPLE : KANT

In some domains (e.g. music analysis), the assumption that R s ck and R s bk represent definitively correct representations is unsustainable. Instead, we might provide a set of 'viewpoints' representing possible (incomplete, uncertain) beliefs about the domain. In KANT, the emphasis is on the negotiative process between the learner, who may have adopted one such (or another) viewpoint, and the tutor. KANT's learner model is an overlay on the system's belief set, which is
dynamically derived from a musical parser.
Multiple generic models
Obviously, the generic model approach and the multiple models approach are not incompatible. Diagnosis is likely to be better if the diagnosis is based on several generic models : each generic model typically defines a global approach to the domain and perturbations bring minor changes in order to come closer to the learner's knowledge. (Ruth, 1976) 
EXAMPLE : Ruth's system
To analyse student's programs, Ruth provided a set of (actually, only two) templates describing possible strategies (e.g. the binary search and Newton's methods for finding zeroes of a function).
After determining the best fit, the program then proceeded to analyse any errors in the student's program with respect to the selected strategy on the basis of known bugs and misconceptions.
In general terms, this approach is the same as 'case-based reasoning' in AI. We have a few basic models (cases) which correspond to the main conceptions of the domain, we select one (as in case-based reasoning), and then adapt it to fit the learner's behaviour. So far, recent research on case-based reasoning has not been applied to learner modelling, but it is likely to become a major research direction.
The bug and misconception catalogues
The bug catalogue (and the misconception catalogue, if it exists) is a key feature of most diagnosis processes. It encapsulates the experience of teachers and psychologists who have observed learners' mistakes in the domain over several years. Its structure derives from the system's knowledge representation : mal-rules for production systems, buggy procedures for procedural networks, false declarations for declarative theories,... The size of the diagnosis space is determined by the size of the system's knowledge This exponentially growing size emphasizes the crucial importance of heuristics in the search process. But the size is not really the critical point to discuss. There are more important factors to take into account such as how several bugs interact to produce errors or how the diagnosis space is explored.
The bug catalogue characteristics also depend on how it has been acquired. We review several methods below. Let's remember that if the updated bug catalogue is only used with the learner who showed these bugs, we have an adaptive system; if the discovered bugs update the bug catalogue which will be used for any learner using the system later on we have an evolutive system.
Predefined bug catalogue
In this case the designers have collected information (themselves, through protocol analysis, or from the literature) about the range of usual bugs or misconceptions that learners show in this domain. The main drawback is the cost of this work : it is very timeconsuming and may not be reused for ITSs in other topics. Another drawback is that the range of possible diagnoses is restricted to those anticipated by the designer (but we will see that this drawback also exists for other approaches, even if it is better hidden). (Anderson and Skwarecki, 1986) The LISP TUTOR has a bug catalogue of some 1200 rules which are buggy variants of the ideal (causal, temporal, functional, etc.) .
EXAMPLE : LISP TUTOR
model's rules. These have been accumulated after years of protocol analysis. (The earlier BUGGY system had similarly built a catalogue of about 100 buggy rules for subtraction by laborious protocol analysis). EXAMPLE : WHY (Collins and Stevens, 1982) By analysing tutorial protocols and asking tutors to comment on their strategies, Stevens and Collins identified a number of learner misconceptions (about meteorology, in this case). Diagnosis involved a complex interaction (in natural language, and hence not implementable) to map from surface errors to misconceptions. They also emphasised the role of multiple viewpoints
Generated from the system's knowledge
In this approach, bugs are obtained by transforming pieces of knowledge taken from R s *k. If R s bk is expressed as rules it is relatively easy to generate changes which may correspond to some common learners' mistakes. A typical example is overgeneralisation which may be obtained by deleting a subset of the condition part of a rule. (Fum, Giangrandi and Tasso, 1988) 
EXAMPLE : ET
ET is an ITS for language learning which uses a standard bug catalogue. However, if a bug is suspected which is not in the catalogue, it is dynamically generated. For example, if the learner persistently uses tense t1 instead of t2, then the rule for t1 is generalised (by removing some andclauses and adding some or-clauses to the condition part) and the rule for t2 is specialised (conversely). Of course, the difficulty with such syntactic transformations is the potential combinatorial explosion.
The process of generating bugs may be improved when based upon a psychological theory, since not all transformations of R s *k are equally plausible:
EXAMPLE : REPAIR (Brown and VanLehn, 1980) The theory proposes that bugs arise from repairs (local patches) If it is possible to automatically generate malrules and misconceptions, then it may also be possible to apply similar techniques to generate correct rules and conceptions. This provokes the idea that instead of modelling the learner entirely with respect to pre-specified domain knowledge R s *k, the learner could be modelled with respect to dynamically generated knowledge. Since the latter knowledge will be incomplete and partly inaccurate (given the limitations of machine learning), the system would probably better function as a collaborative partner, offering advice and suggestions about the material and the learning process, than as a tutor leading the learner to target expertise (Gilmore and Self, 1988; Dillenbourg and Self, 1990) . The potential benefits of such an approach are that it might (a) reduce the demands on the accuracy of learner modelling, (b) focus more on important metacognitive skills, and (c) give learners a better view of what the learning process should entail.
Acquired from explicit interaction
This approach consists of interacting with a learner or with an expert-teacher. The system may present a set of mistakes that has been empirically collected or that it generates.
The user is invited to describe the bugs or misconceptions underlying these mistakes. The interaction will obviously be different for a learner and a teacher. Such a component of diagnosis systems is called a diagnosis space editor. A diagnosis space editor may be viewed as a tool for knowledge acquisition, similar to a tape recorder or notebook for knowledge engineers, but with a greater interactivity and with automatic integration of new knowledge.
3.2.3.1 Explicit interaction with the learner. The difficulties in obtaining directly from learners useful descriptions of bugs and misconceptions for inclusion in a bug or misconception catalogue have been summarised by Wenger (1987) : "Not only does the current state of the art set technical limitations on dialogues between systems and people, but people's account of their own actions and understanding can be rather incoherent and sometimes unreliable. Even if they are coherent and reliable -and the language can be processed -there remains the issue of understanding these self-reports in terms of the models that learners have of the domain, of themselves, and of the system." Nevertheless, according to Wenger, "Sleeman has found in interviews that even fairly young learners are able to speak about their own knowledge of algebraic manipulations."
We need to distinguish between off-line designer-learner interactions (which is a version of protocol analysis which may lead to pre-defined catalogues), off-line systemlearner interactions (where the 'system' here is a knowledge acquisition tool, not an ITS) and on-line system-learner interactions (where the 'system' is the diagnostic component of an ITS). The first two are evolutive approaches, the third adaptive (unless the outcomes are kept for other learners, in which case, it too is evolutive).
Explicit interaction with an expert-teacher.
Here the interaction is necessarily offline, i.e. not with an ITS, but with a knowledge engineer or knowledge acquisition tool.
We might hope that interactions with experienced teachers will lead to insights more quickly than does a lengthy protocol analysis by ITS designers. (Chanier, Pengelly, Self and Twidale, 1990) BELLOC is a tutoring system for second language learning which can also be used 
EXAMPLE : BELLOC
Acquired from implicit interaction with the learner
In several approaches, the system uses mechanisms which enable it to extract bugs through some analysis of the learners' behaviour. These mechanisms are described in the following section on the search process. The important thing to note here is that in some systems the discovered bugs are recorded to enlarge the bug catalogue.
If the discovered bugs are simply added to the bug catalogue, the size of the search space is naturally increased. However, we can imagine that when new bugs are integrated with old ones in a more complex process, some bugs become partially redundant, which reduces the increase of the search space and may even decrease it.
The generic operators
Previous estimates of the size of the diagnosis space were based on the assumption of the existence of a universal generic operator such that any subset of R s bk may be associated with any subset of the bug catalogue: (Reiser, Anderson and Farrell, 1985) The
LISP TUTOR includes a buggy rule for the merging of two lists in which the function 'list' is specified instead of the 'append' which appears in the corresponding ideal rule. If the former rule is included in the learner model then the latter rule would be excluded.
This logical consistency presents the advantage of reducing the diagnosis space.
However, it means that we cannot represent the sometimes contradictory knowledge of learners : a learner may sometimes behave as if he apparently believes P and ¬P. We say "apparently" because in fact he generally believes P and ¬P in different contexts so that he does not see any contradiction. These different context may be viewed as hidden conditions. Some work attempts to use beliefs systems for representing such inconsistencies and for performing diagnosis in general (e.g. Mizoguchi, Ikeda and Kakusho, 1988; Huang, McCalla and Greer, 1990 ).
The ** operator implies indeed some psychological theory describing how correct and incorrect knowledge may interact. The best example is again repair theory, where ** enables the deduction of a bug from some missing knowledge with respect to plausible repair mechanisms.
The most studied characteristic of ** is the number of bugs which may be combined within one R s R l bk. We touch here on the notion of a simple versus compound bug. A compound bug is the interaction of several bugs. If ** only accepts simple bugs, then the diagnosis space equals the size of the bug catalogue. If ** accepts the interaction of several bugs, it exponentially increases the search space.
That is only one problem resulting from accepting compound bugs. A more dramatic issue is that the bugs' effects interact in a complex way on the learner's behaviour. Hence, the process of inferring the bug from the behaviour becomes more complex. At the extreme, the combination of several bugs may sometimes produce a correct answer!
THE SEARCH PROCESS
The search process aims to match data (b l p) with a model (R s R l *k), or inversely to match the model to the data. Diagnosis search processes are ranged between two extremes :
-purely data-driven approaches : the diagnosis is built from the learner behaviour, without reference to a predefined model.
-purely model-driven : weak search methods explore the diagnosis space, generate models and match the model predictions to learner behaviour.
The first method is not feasible except in very simple domains; the second raises combinatorial explosion problems. Both neglect the heuristic value of the other method: models are required for interpreting behavioural data, and behavioural data are required for pruning the search space of possible models. However, the heuristic value of behavioural data is reduced by the presence of noise. Most search methods are somewhere between these two extremes -we present them from data-driven to model-driven:
Direct inference approaches
A direct inference approach is based on the postulate that the bug (and misconception) may be inferred directly from the error.
The first step is to identify the difference between the learner's and system's behaviours ∆(R s b l p,b s p). This step is not as simple as it appears. What is for instance the difference between 3 and 6? It may be double, plus 3, greater, over 5, even, ... The search space for this difference is actually infinite. Hence, this approach requires an error catalogue which restricts the search space by telling the system which differences must be considered. By contrast with the bug catalogue, the error catalogue is often implicit : the considered differences are encrypted in the behaviour comparison process.
The second step is to infer a bug from the identified error. The term "direct inference approach" indicates that there are some predefined links between errors and bugs. This may be represented by a set of pairs (error i , bug j ). The bug may then be directly deduced from the error. The point we want to make here is that there is no search during the second stage. The search is limited to finding, among a set of errors, which one best characterises the learner's behaviour.
EXAMPLE : WEST (Burton and Brown, 1976) WEST (Hawkes and Derry, 1989) 
TAPS compares the learner solution with the expert solution and classifies each deviation in terms of a bug catalogue. (In fact, their catalogue is called an 'error classification' although it seems to include both errors, i.e. matters concerning behaviour, (e.g. 'hesitancy'), and bugs, i.e. matters concerning behavioural knowledge (e.g. 'student constructs schema that is not on the correct solution path')).
EXAMPLE : TDTDT (Daelemans, 1988) The links from errors (e.g. using 'dt' instead of 't' in a Dutch word) to bugs (e.g. 'using third person instead of second person') are the result of the system learning through progressive refinement, using techniques developed for learning heuristic rules in second generation expert systems.
As we said, the error catalogue is generally not explicit. It may also be defined in a synthetic way, one rule defining several error-bug links:
EXAMPLE : GUIDON (Clancey, 1987) Here is for instance a diagnostic rule used by GUIDON : An identical approach may be designed for the conceptual level, i.e. for linking errors with misconceptions. However, such links are even more difficult to determine than the error-bug links.
EXAMPLE : MENO II (Soloway, et al, 1983) 
MENO-II associated errors (e.g. READ(X) placed at start of program) with bugs (e.g. 'put READ statements with the declarations') and then with misconceptions (e.g. 'READ is a kind of declaration') by using links from entries in a bug catalogue to nodes of a network representing misconceptions. Some bugs may be linked to more than one misconception.
The direct inference approach to learner modelling raises many criticisms because it is generally very difficult to associate an error with one and only one bug or misconception.
Horizontal extension of the behaviour
The value of ¢(b l p,R l bk) is mainly affected by non-systematic factors (see section 2.4). This kind of noise has been defined as behavioural variations between equivalent problems. Consequently, if one considers the common characteristics of several behaviours, i.e. if one abandons the variations, one reduces the noise and hence increases the consistency : ¢(b l p,R l bk) < ¢(B l P,R l bk)|P ={p i ,..,p j } and p i ≈... ≈p j where B l P represents this set of behaviours (we use an uppercase B and P to distinguish the sets from the elements b and p). We call B l P a horizontal extension of b l p because each behaviour of B l P is at the same level. 
Synthetic behaviour
One may envisage applying inductive techniques to develop a synthetic behaviour which generalises the behaviour set B l P into a single (hypothetical) behaviour b l p. This synthetic behaviour is close to the concept of a mental model as a set of decontextualised rules of actions. Expert-teachers are probably able to perform the generalisation involved in this inductive process. However, they use in this generalisation process an enormous amount of knowledge which is not available to the computerized tutor. (Dillenbourg, 1990) PROTO-TEG attempts to learn conditions under which a didactic strategy should be applied, on the basis of learner model characteristics during (successful and unsuccessful) 
EXAMPLE : PROTO-TEG
Multiple diagnosis feedback
Instead, existing learner modelling systems have exploited B l P as a kind of multiple feedback : verifying R s R l bk by running it on problems p i to p j and matching the results with behaviours from B l P and eliminating diagnoses which do not predict a sufficient percentage of these behaviours. (See also section 4.4 on diagnosis feedback.) EXAMPLE : DEBUGGY (Burton, 1982) In 
Temporal issues
This section raises the issue of time. Time is implicitly represented in our framework by the indices associated with the problems, since these problems have to be presented successively.
4.2.3.1 Urgency of didactic choices. The first difficulty is that collecting several behaviours before building a diagnosis implies that this diagnosis -and the subsequent didactic decisions -is postponed. Wenger (1987, p.383 ) expressed this issue as "... the contradictory requirements of being at once sensitive enough to adapt the tutor's attitude without delay, and stable enough not to be easily disturbed by local variations in performance". The solution of this difficulty must take into account the time learners spend on each problem, the learner's resistance to the frustration associated with a failure, and the danger of installing faulty behaviours by repetition, and must balance these factors against the gain expected from more valid diagnoses. This problem is not unsolvable: explanationbased techniques include a generalisation stage based on a single example -but have severe requirements with respect to the available knowledge:
EXAMPLE: MORE (Costa and Urbano, 1990 4.2.3.2 Longitudinal consistency. The second difficulty is that the learners are changing.
We have described behavioural variations over time as noise, provided these behaviours are related to the same knowledge state. However, in many cases, b l p i at time i and b l p j at time j may result from different mental models. In other words, longitudinal inconsistencies may reveal knowledge changes instead of noise.
Longitudinal consistency has generally been expressed by statistical parameters. The problem is precisely that statistical measures "scratch" the time dimension and ignore the variations in knowledge over time. For instance, imagine two hypotheses are found to explain ten learner's behaviours. Let b1 denote the behaviours explained by the first hypothesis and b2 those explained by the second. If the set of behaviours is "b2 b1 b2 b1 b1 b2 b1 b1 b2 b1", we can say that the first hypothesis is more plausible (60%). However, with the same 60/40 distribution, we can have a behaviour sequence "b1 b1 b1 b1 b1 b1 b2 b2 b2 b2" from which we may deduce that the second hypothesis is better for the learner's knowledge at the end of the sequence of exercises.
These knowledge changes should be an important aspect of diagnosis. Behaviour should not be diagnosed in isolation but in the context of an on-going teaching and learning process. The current learner model and our expectations about learning outcomes should enable us to restrict the search space for an updated learner model. (Goldstein, 1979) The R s *k for WUSOR III included 'genetic' links However, a satisfactory integration of the system's diagnostic process with the learner's learning process has yet to be achieved. It demands a more valid psychological model of learning (as well as domain representation) than we are currently able to provide.
EXAMPLE: WUSOR III
Vertical extensions of the behaviour
Extending the behaviour vertically means including in it a part of the solution path or intermediate representations. This extended behaviour is closer to R l bk since it is intermediate between the problem and the solution. If the distance between the model and the behaviour is shorter, the consistency ¢(b l p,R s R l bk) will be higher and, subsequently, the diagnosis error ∆(R l bk,R s R l bk) will be reduced.The extreme case would be when the learner behaviour includes his knowledge, i.e. the case where the interface makes learner knowledge directly observable.
Including solution paths in the behaviour
We first examine the case where the learner's behaviour includes part of the solution path, i.e. some steps of the solution path (see Figure 9 ). (Anderson, 1984) aims to constrain the learner to adopt a behaviour whose granularity is as close as possible (ideally identical) to the granularity of the inference process used by R s bk. This enables the system to match each learner step with one of its own steps, i.e. to "trace" the learner's behaviour. In the systems designed by Anderson and his colleagues, the granularity is very fine. This approach raises many questions concerning the (arbitrary) definition of the intermediate steps and the educational disadvantages of increasing the constraints on the learner. (Reiser, Anderson and Farrell, 1985) The EXAMPLE: PIXIE (Sleeman, 1982 Most of the work in this area has appealed to the psychological status of production systems as cognitive models (rather than as a means for supporting computational modularity, as discussed in section 3.1.1).
EXAMPLE: LISP TUTOR
EXAMPLE : ACM (Langley and Ohlsson, 1984) ACM reconstructs a solution path by an exhaustive search using a set of primitive operators 
Including intermediate representations in the behaviour
Extending the behaviour with some part of the solution path may be insufficient because the solution path never covers the complete reasoning process. In the case of equation-solving, for instance, the solution path does not include the mental activities performed to decide what will be the next step. Identifying the learner's plans (as a part of extend vertically her behaviour by asking her to make her plans explicit (see Figure 11 ). (Twidale, 1989) EPIC requires learners to specify their plans before they input lines of a logical proof. The plan is represented by a natural language-like template which must be instantiated to the problem at hand. It is interesting to note that the learner's reification of her reasoning process presents advantages not only for the diagnosis process. This constraint appears to have positive educational effects since the learner has to perform the metacognitive activity to bring into consciousness some parts of her reasoning which were often implicit. For instance, with EPIC learners said that they discovered the importance of plans in their proof constructions, and with BRIDGE learners must reflect on the programming methodology which BRIDGE imposes. (Anderson, Boyle and Yost, 1985) The GEOMETRY TUTOR requires students to develop proofs using a proof graph (a form of intermediate representation). In a related experiment, Singley (1987) showed that the activity of 'goal-posting' generally improves problem-solving performance.
EXAMPLE : GEOMETRY TUTOR
Diagnosis feedback
The scheduling of diagnosis feedback (that is, feedback to the system about its diagnosis, not 'didactic feedback' to the learner) enables a differentiation between datadriven and model-driven approaches. In a data-driven approach, behavioural information is intensively used in building the hypothesis. Consequently, the feedback arrives later and with a higher probability of being positive. In model-driven methods, the behavioural information only partially prunes the diagnosis space and hence leaves many concurrent hypotheses. Consequently, feedback is required sooner and has a higher probability of being negative, i.e. feedback is more important.
Behavioural simulation
Given that R s R l bk is runnable, it can produce a simulation of the learner's behaviour, which we denote by b l p'. Hence ¢(R s R l bk,b l p') = 1. If the simulation matches the learner's behaviour, the diagnosis is confirmed:
If not, one has to check if the difference between the behaviour and its simulation is not a matter of noise. There are two ways of tackling this appearance of noise: first, by using multiple diagnosis feedback (section 4.2.2) and secondly, by 'coercing' the learner's behaviour. A coercion is an attempt to explain (away) slips in some rational way. For example, the DEBUGGY system used a set of coercions representing common performance slips in an attempt to eliminate slips from the data. Of course, it is somewhat self-contradictory to seek rational explanations for slips, as defined.
Didactic prediction
If the learner model is valid, it can be used to select a didactic action, i.e. to predict the efficiency of this action or to anticipate the learner's knowledge after the action. If the predicted changes happen, the diagnosis is confirmed. This approach is described in the pragmatic approach (section 2.5.1). We defined a didactic action DA by a triple (*k x ,DA,*k y ), where ∆(*k x ,*k y ) describes the expected knowledge changes associated with DA. Didactic prediction uses *k y for confirming the *k x diagnosis: This approach raises two problems. First, we need to link learner models and didactic actions with certainty, i.e. to predict knowledge changes resulting from didactic actions.
Secondly, the knowledge change has also to be attested through the diagnosis process, which makes the difficulty recurrent.
EXAMPLE : PROTO-TEG (Dillenbourg, 1990) The 
Behavioural prediction
Instead of behavioural simulation, we can have behavioural prediction: additional p j are generated and subsequent learner behaviours are used to confirm the diagnosis: EXAMPLE : IDEBUGGY (Burton, 1982) Here, we come back to the temporal issue: the method presupposes that the learner's knowledge does not change between p i and p j . The interest is in the interactive aspect of this approach : p j may be generated by the system to permit a more precise diagnosis, for instance for discriminating two hypotheses. Ideally, the discriminating problems should be generated by domain-independent mechanisms analysing the representations of the bugs, not from pre-specified problem generators associated with each bug. Here we are concerned with disambiguating two (or more) hypotheses that the system has about the learner, but of course the learner may in fact hold two hypotheses, not one. Therefore generating a test problem may help both the system and the learner. Similarly, a test problem (a counter-example) might be generated to reveal (to the learner) differences between the learner's hypothesis and the system's 'correct' hypothesis.
EXAMPLE : PG (Evertsz, 1989) PG has a correct production system model for the domain of fraction subtraction. Given a learner model in the same form, PG generates a counter-example by reasoning about the abstract computational behaviour of the learner model.
Explicit interaction
This approach consists of asking the learner to confirm the diagnosis -it is seldom applicable, but very efficient when it is:
EXAMPLE : ACE (Sleeman and Hendley, 1979) 
Human validation
Just as expert teachers may be engaged in an off-line process to acquire knowledge to be used in diagnosis, so they may be involved off-line in evaluating the diagnoses actually produced by an ITS.
Fuzzy diagnosis
At the beginning of this section we said that the aim of the search process is to match data with a model. As is now apparent, this is an unreasonable aim, which perhaps should be recognised from the outset. In general, the learner model will contain a number of components which the system is more or less sure of. A number of techniques for handling this problem are implicit in the foregoing discussion. In addition, there are a few systems which address this point explicitly:
EXAMPLE : IMPART (Elsom-Cook, 1988) IMPART proposes a 'bounded user model' in (Hawkes and Derry, 1989) The learner model of TAPS uses fuzzy terms ('very likely', 'possibly') (Greer, Mark and McCalla, 1989) SCENT 
CONCLUSIONS
We have attempted to provide a computationally-oriented conceptual framework within which methods for learner modelling can be described. Most if not all of the techniques described in the literature can be encompassed in this framework. The aim of developing the framework is to help make it easier to assess the contributions that individual techniques make to the general problem of learner modelling, and to see where individual techniques 'fit' within the general schema.
Apart from the general outcome of providing a framework and a notation for thinking about learner modelling, two main conclusions follow from this review:
1. That many approaches to learner modelling, although often presented as if they were in competition with one another, are in fact complementary since they address different parts of the framework -this is made clear in the figures, where annotations appear in different places.
2. That most of the work on learner modelling has been concentrated on the lower half of our framework, that is, on the behaviour <-> behavioural knowledge mapping, with a relative neglect of the conceptual knowledge component.
As a corollary of this report, we can anticipate three future activities in learner modelling research:
